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ABSTRACT
Although one segment of the proactive cybersecurity debate—
e.g., hack back—has long been derided as a policy option carrying
with it great risks of escalation, among other concerns, elements
within the U.S. Congress and abroad are actively pushing to give
companies a freer hand at defending themselves against cyber
attackers. This Article compares several of these efforts, focusing on
the so-called Graves bill in the United States with the experiences of
China, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and the G7. Given the
Republican National Committee’s 2016 embrace of active defense
principles, even as some firms like FireEye have begun to publicly
admit to hacking back, the time has come to take a fresh look at the
implications of this regulatory trend for both business integrity and
international security.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the May 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack,
which impacted more than 200,000 computers spread across 150
nations,1 calls regarding the “sorry state” of cybersecurity became
louder, leading some to resurrect a now old debate about permitting
firms a freer hand in defending themselves from the onslaught of
cyber attackers.2 On its face, such a policy might be sensical, echoing
self-defense rationale and responding to the fact that many
sophisticated companies are in the best position to know and
understand their own defenses, and what they need to do “to protect
their customers, networks, and valuable trade secrets.” 3 Such
sentiments informed Georgia’s State Bill 315, which was passed in
May 2018 and would have permitted “active defense measures that
are designed to prevent or detect unauthorized computer access”
until it was vetoed by former Governor Nathan Deal due to its
“national security implications and other potential ramifications.”4
Governor Deal’s veto statement, issued at the urging of tech firms,5
serves to highlight that the problems involved in crafting such a
policy are manifest, including attribution and escalation,6 although
this has not stopped proponents from pushing the idea forward as

1 WannaCry ransom notice analysis suggests Chinese link, BBC (May 29, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40085241
[https://perma.cc/68RG7Q46].
2 See Josephine Wolff, When Companies Get Hacked, Should They Be Allowed to
(July
14,
2017),
Hack
Back?,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/hacking-back-activedefense/533679/ [https://perma.cc/LVL4-NBDH].
3 Scott J. Shackelford, When it Comes to Cyber Security, Passive Defense is Best,
UNDARK (Feb. 19, 2019), https://undark.org/2019/02/19/when-it-comes-to-cybersecurity-passive-defense-is-best/ [https://perma.cc/M57J-BNXY]; see, e.g.,
Intangible Assets Increase to 84% of the S&P 500’s Value in 2015 Report, BUS.
INTANGIBLES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.businessintangibles.com/singlepost/2015/03/11/Intangible-Assets-Increase-to-84-of-the-SP-500s-Value-in-2015Report [https://perma.cc/DTL7-AKP3].
4
Tara Seals, Georgia Governor Vetoes Controversial Hack-Back Bill, THREATPOST
(May 9, 2018), https://threatpost.com/georgia-governor-vetoes-controversialhack-back-bill/131822/ [https://perma.cc/L2HG-NU6Q].
5
Zaid Shoorbajee, Google and Microsoft ask Georgia governor to veto ‘hack back’
bill, CYBERSCOOP (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com/georgia-sb-315hack-back-google-microsoft/ [https://perma.cc/4SBU-Q9GR].
6
Veto Number 18 – SB315 (May 8, 2018), https://gov.georgia.gov/pressreleases/2018-05-08/deal-issues-2018-veto-statements [https://perma.cc/QG5BULUX].
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part of the larger movement toward “proactive cybersecurity,” both
in the United States and indeed around the world.7
Proactive cybersecurity is an amorphous field, comprising a
wide range of active and passive measures that are often commonly,
though not always accurately, referred to as “active defense.” While
“hacking back” is a lightning rod within this field,8 it is just one data
point in a larger and more dynamic movement, which includes
technological, organizational, and legal best practices deep packet
inspection to audits promoting defense-in-depth.9 Going hand-inhand with this amorphous understanding lies ambiguity with
regards to the legality of active defense techniques such as
“honeypots” and information sharing that are acknowledged by
some governments as best practices.10 This Article, though, focuses

See Wolff, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Carl Franzen, Should US companies be allowed to hack China in revenge?
VERGE
(May
22,
2013),
New
report
says
yes,
THE
http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/22/4356196/report-tells-congresscompanies-should-hack-back [https://perma.cc/JX7X-FE7X]; see also Eric
Chabrow, The Case Against Hack-Back, BANK INFO. SEC. (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/case-against-hack-back-a-7759
[https://perma.cc/9WXW-U7TK]; Tom Field, To ‘Hack Back’ or Not?, BANK INFO.
SEC. (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/to-hack-back-or-not-a5545 [https://perma.cc/7XUH-H8T9] (discussing, among other things, the
likelihood of prosecution in the United States for engaging in hacking back).
9
See, e.g., Orla Cox, Proactive Cybersecurity—Taking Control Away from
(Apr.
2,
2014),
Attackers,
SYMANTEC
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/proactive-cybersecurity-takingcontrol-away-attackers [https://perma.cc/3XM6-R369]; Michael A. Davis, 4 Steps
For
Proactive
Cybersecurity,
INFO.
WK.
(Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/4-steps-forproactive-cybersecurity/d/d-id/1108270
[https://perma.cc/8XYL-H3PN];
Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private Sector, SEC. TODAY,
https://sec.today/events/talk/3f45c4ca-98e7-4dcf-959c-86d73e51f8f5/
[https://perma.cc/7QTP-BGW5] (“[A]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse
set of techniques along a spectrum of varying risk and legality.”).
10 See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK & INFO. SEC., PROACTIVE
DETECTION
OF
SECURITY
INCIDENTS
II:
HONEYPOTS
17
(2012),
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/support/proactivedetection/proactive-detection-of-security-incidents-II-honeypots
[https://perma.cc/7PRY-RNSP] (defining a “honeypot” as a “computing resource,
whose sole task is to be probed, attacked, compromised, used or accessed in any
other unauthorized way”); Sean Lyngaas, NIST spells out information-sharing best
practices, FCW (Oct. 30, 2014), http://fcw.com/articles/2014/10/30/nist-sharingbest-practices.aspx [https://perma.cc/P9UL-CZ6L].
7
8
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on the active defense debate given its continued prevalence among
policymakers in the United States and around the world.11
Although “hack back” has long been derided as a policy option
carrying with it great risks of escalation and enabling industrial
espionage, among other concerns,12 policymakers at the federal and
state levels in the United States, and abroad, are actively pushing to
give companies a freer hand at defending themselves against cyber
attackers.13 In fact, even as some commentators still call it the “worst
cybersecurity policy idea,” 14 the policy has enjoyed remarkable
staying power, even rising to the level of being included in the 2016
Republican National Committee (RNC) Platform. 15 An entire
industry is being created to help enable interested firms to engage
in active defense measures, 16 despite the fact that relatively few
commentators—with the notable exception of former Homeland
Security Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker—see much benefit in
legalizing active defense measures. 17 Moreover, few seem
convinced that the policy is even technically desirable given other
established techniques for attributing cyberattacks back to their
source.18 There seems to be more agreement, for example, on the
need to reign in law enforcement’s use of the rather vague Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) given a spate of high-profile and
11
For more on the development of the entire proactive cybersecurity field, see
Amanda N. Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A
Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 722 (2015).
12 See, e.g., Josephine Wolff, Attack of the Hack Back, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://slate.com/technology/2017/10/hacking-back-the-worst-idea-incybersecurity-rises-again.html [https://perma.cc/X7E3-ZYCF].
13 See id.; Craig, Shackelford & Hiller, supra note 11.
14
See Wolff, supra note 12. (“Active defense, for those not familiar with
cybersecurity euphemisms, is the polite term for offense. It’s meant to convey that
you’re just protecting yourself, not attacking anyone, even though, of course, you
are attacking someone—that’s what makes it so “active.”).
15 See Paul Szoldra, This one sentence in the GOP platform has cybersecurity experts
freaking out, BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 2016) , http://www.businessinsider.com/gopplatform-hacking-back-2016
7?pundits_only=0&get_oall_comments=1&no_reply_filter=1
[https://perma.cc/M8FE-G3GF].
16 See, e.g., Fahmida Y. Rashid, Legal hack back lets you go after attackers in your
network,
CSO
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3234661/hacking/legal-hack-back-lets-yougo-after-attackers-in-your-network.html [https://perma.cc/J8F5-QMAE].
17 See Wolff, supra note 12.
18 See, e.g., Joe Uchill, Rep: Hacking back bill not ‘the Wild West,’ THE HILL (May
26, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/335294-rep-hacking-back-billnot-the-wild-west [https://perma.cc/U4T7-GTRF].
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controversial prosecutions in recent years.19 This Article compares
several of these efforts, focusing on the Active Cyber Defense
Certainty (ACDC) Act proposed in the United States with the
experience of China, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and the G7.
Given the Republican National Committee’s embrace of active
defense principles, even as some firms like FireEye have begun to
publicly admit to hacking back, the time has come to take a fresh
look at the implications of this regulatory trend for both business
integrity and international security especially given that there is a
paucity of literature on the topic to date.20
The Article is structured as follows. Part I unpacks the multifaceted cyber threat facing the private sector that has given birth to
now renewed calls to permit active defense measures. Part II
analyzes the evolution of the active defense debate in the United
States, paying particular attention to the ACDC Act including
interviews with representations from Congress and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. Part III compares U.S. effort at reforming
active defense with Singapore’s proactive cybersecurity policy
surrounding the protection of its critical infrastructure, which has
now been underway since 2015, along with those of Australia and
China. Part IV investigates the policy implications of this research
for managers and policymakers, including for the cyber risk

19 See Kim Zetter, The Most Controversial Hacking Cases of the Past Decade, WIRED
(Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/cfaa-computer-fraud-abuseact-most-controversial-computer-hacking-cases/
[https://perma.cc/HHN7CJTY].
20 Cf. Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1019, n.172
(2018) (citing Paul Rosenzweig, International Law and Private Actor Active Cyber
Defensive Measures, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 104 (2014) (“In the United States, scholars
have begun to debate the legality of hack back. To date, that examination has
focused exclusively on domestic U.S. law. The discussion is inconclusive, though it
is probably fair to say that the weight of analysis favors the conclusion that active
hack back by private sector U.S. actors violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA).” (footnote omitted))); Robert Chesney, Legislative Hackback: Notes: on
the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act Discussion Draft, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2017, 10:30
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legislative-hackback-notes-active-cyberdefense-certainty-act-discussion-draft
[https://perma.cc/BAD26MN2] (describing the discussion draft of the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act,
proposed by Representative Tom Graves, which would exempt “active cyber
defense measures” from liability under the CFAA); Rebecca Crootof, International
Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 581
(2018); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities,
Dangers, and Legal Responses, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 196 (2018).
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insurance industry, along with the promise of targeted proactive
cybersecurity measures to contribute to a polycentric cyber peace.21
1.

UNPACKING THE CYBER THREAT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A great deal has been written about the evolution of cyberattacks
over the past thirty years since the Morris Worm was unleashed
back on November 2, 1988.22 It is not the purpose of this section to
rehash this work, but rather to briefly introduce the multi-faceted
nature of the cyber threat facing the private sector, which is
animating calls for active defense measures.23 In short, firms of all
sizes face a growing list of antagonists online including hacktivists,
criminal organizations, economic competitors, and even nation
states; indeed, the threat environment is so complex and dynamic

21 See Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 77
(Hamadoun I. Touré & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec. World Fed’n
Scientists eds., 2011), http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GENWFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XBH-HSMS]. For a more general
background on the application of polycentric governance to addressing
cybersecurity, see Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric
Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895 (2015); Amanda Craig, Scott
J. Shackelford & Janine Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and
Regulatory Analysis, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort
& Jamie Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353
(2014); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace
by Safeguarding Trade Secrets through Bilateral Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1
(2015).
22
To see the original findings from Cornell on this episode, see TED EISENBERG
ET
AL.,
THE
COMPUTER
WORM,
(Feb.
6,
1989),
http://simson.net/ref/1989/Cornell_Worm_Report_1989.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VKE-35ST]. Some argue that the first cyber attack was in fact
years earlier in 1982 when a gas pipeline in Siberia exploded allegedly as a result of
Soviet spies who had stolen software from a Canadian company that had been
implanted with a CIA-sponsored logic bomb, resulting in “the most monumental
non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.” THOMAS C. REED, AT THE
ABYSS: AN INSIDER’S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 269 (2005).
23
See generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE, ch. 1 &
ch. 4 (2014) (discussing the rise in cyber threat including cybercrime and espionage,
analyzing the development and history of cyber conflicts as well as the
cybersecurity strategies of the cyber powers, arguing that cyber powers’ relying on
an exclusively state-centric approach to cybersecurity may be problematic, and
suggesting there is need for polycentric governance that includes private-sector
engagement along with multilateral collaboration).
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that there are growing calls to unleash artificial intelligence (AI) to
manage it more effectively.24
Hard, verifiable data is difficult to come by in the cybersecurity
space given how reticent many firms are to share when they have
been breached, and given that, until recently, many governments
have not required firms to disclose the details of their breaches.25
Estimates range greatly, for example, with regards to the overall
number of cyber attacks targeting private firms and how much the
average data breach is costing companies. 26 According to the
Ponemon Institute, the average data breach cost U.S. companies $7
million in 2017.27 But, depending on the scale of the cyber attack in
question, costs can quickly skyrocket—the Equifax breach, for
example, will reportedly wind up costing its insurers alone at least
$125 million.28 On average, a recent report from the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) found that “[a]fter suffering a breach
of customers’ personal data, the average attacked firm loses 1.1
percent of its market value and experiences a 3.2 percentage point
drop in its year-on-year sales growth rate.” 29 Not exactly eye24 See, e.g., Alfred Ng, Stop Cyberattacks. Just Add Robots, CNET (Sept. 1, 2017,
5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/cyberattacks-artificial-intelligence-aihackers-defcon-black-hat/ [https://perma.cc/6YHX-8M2H] (arguing that AI can
help humans deal with cybersecurity more effectively).
25
See, e.g., SEC. EXCHANGE COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidancetopic2.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ4A-8PFH]. It is worth noting that the European
Union will require such disclosures part of the new Network Information Security
(NIS) Directive, see Peter J. Beshar, How Companies Should Prepare for Europe’s New
Cybersecurity
Rules,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
3,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/cybersecurity-europe/ [https://perma.cc/58JYTZNT].
26 See, e.g., April 2017 Cyber Attacks Statistics, HACKMAGEDDON (June 9, 2017),
http://www.hackmageddon.com/2017/06/09/april-2017-cyber-attacksstatistics/ [https://perma.cc/9J6E-57ZR].
27
Data Breaches Cost US Businesses an Average of $7 Million—Here’s the
Breakdown,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Apr.
27,
2017,
11:00
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/sc/data-breaches-cost-us-businesses-7-million2017-4 [https://perma.cc/AUE4-EUE9] (noting that these costs include
remediation, customer attrition, business disruption, regulatory fines, legal and
public relations costs, direct financial costs, notification costs, credit card reissues
and identity theft repair/credit monitoring).
28 See Equifax Data Breach to Cost Insurers $125 Million: Property Claim Services,
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifaxbreach-insurance/equifax-data-breach-to-cost-insurers-125-million-propertyclaim-services-idUSKCN1C71Y8 [https://perma.cc/KSC5-BXAR].
29
Shinichi Kamiya et al., What is the Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target
Firms?,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 24409, 2018),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24409 [https://perma.cc/Z8HP-P3LA].
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watering figures; in fact, some firms, such as LinkedIn, saw their
stock prices actually rise following significant cyber attacks.30 As a
result of such misaligned incentives, proponents like Baker argue
that the only way forward is to unleash the power of the private
sector to better protect their networks, and vulnerable U.S. critical
infrastructure given the fact that more than eighty-five percent of it
is owned and operated by companies. 31 The spectrum of active
defense options is summarized in Figure 1.

30 See Nicole Perlroth, Lax Security at LinkedIn Is Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/technology/linkedin-breachexposes-light-security-even-at-data-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/X7X6HR7J] (stating that LinkedIn’s stock rose four percent at the end of the week after
the breach became public on Wednesday).
31
See Stewart Baker, Support for Retribution and Active Defense Increases,
STEPTOE (May 22, 2013), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2013/05/22/supportfor-retribution-and-active-defense-increases/
[https://perma.cc/2SHZ-AVAQ]
(arguing that private companies are being encouraged to do more than passively
defend their networks); see also FEMA, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (June 2011),
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/programs/oppa/critical_infrastructure_pap
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5LT-9V4V] (stating that the private sector owns roughly
eighty-five percent of the United States critical infrastructure and key resources).
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Figure 1: Active Defense Spectrum32

To consider how this idea plays out in practice, let us dive into
the example of Shawn Carpenter, who in 2003 was a security analyst
at Sandia National Laboratories tasked with investigating a cyber
attack on Lockheed Martin. 33 Quickly, Carpenter and his team
discovered evidence of Chinese state-sponsored hacking using
‘rootkits’ to mask their intrusions. 34 Wishing to hold those
responsible accountable, Carpenter suggested that the group should
hack back at the servers responsible, but leadership at Sandia
forbade the attempt since it was in violation of the CFAA, as is
discussed in Part II. Instead, Carpenter laid a trap for the attackers
by generating honeypots, which are files used to fool hackers, full of
faked intelligence documents.35 Sure enough, they took the bait, and
Carpenter followed the hackers back to their source; in the end, “the
rabbit hole went much deeper than I imagined.” 36 The myriad
difficulties Carpenter faced still bedevil active defense proponents
to this day, from encryption and attribution issues to spoofing IP

32
See WYATT HOFFMAN & ARIEL E. LEVITE, CAN ACTIVE MEASURES HELP
STABILIZE
CYBERSPACE?
9
(2017),
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Cyber_Defense_INT_final_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DEE5-YKGA].
33 See Nicholas Schmidle, The Digital Vigilantes Who Hack Back, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/07/the-digitalvigilantes-who-hack-back [https://perma.cc/8HAU-F6VU].
34
Id.; see also Symantec, Windows Rootkit Overview 4–6 (2010),
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9TXZ-DMT6] (explaining that Microsoft rootkits refer to
programs that use system hooking or modification to hide programs and behaviors
and distinguishing between kernel mode and user mode rootkits).
35 See Schmidle, supra note 33.
36 Id.
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addresses and the use of virtual private networks (VPNs).37 But he
persisted, and eventually located gigabytes of stolen U.S. defense
secrets on a server in South Korea, including plans for the F-22
Raptor and the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter.38 Eventually, despite
assurances from the FBI, Carpenter was fired for his efforts, though
a jury in 2007 awarded him $4.7 million in damages. This test of U.S.
legal tolerance for active defense—defining where proactive
cybersecurity ends and hacking back begins—helps set the stage for
Part II, which unpacks the evolution of this legal concept, along with
its current manifestation in the form of the ACDC Act.
2.

THE EVOLUTION OF ACTIVE DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES

Despite longstanding interest in the field of proactive
cybersecurity, the field has been relatively slow to develop. For
instance, early examples from the 2000s include efforts on the part
of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to contain the
problem of piracy by going after the pirates with distributed denial
of service (“DDoS”) attacks, Trojan horses, and rootkits. 39 Other
examples include “Flash Mobs” targeting fake bank sites.40 In sum,
however, such efforts were limited, fragmented, and relatively
unsophisticated. The reasons for this state of affairs are manifold,
but include difficulties of attribution, 41 and the fact that
cybersecurity was in those times an issue of far less salience and
resulting concern to managers and boards of directors contributing

37 Id. ( “If hackers in Bucharest want to steal from a bank in Omaha, they might
first penetrate a server in Kalamazoo, and from there one in Liverpool, and from
there one in Perth, and so on, until their trail is thoroughly obscured.”).
38 Id.
39 See Robert Anderson, Brian Lum & Bhavjit Walha, Offense vs. Defense, 16
(Dec.
11,
2005),
http://courses.cs.washington.eu/courses/csep590/05au/whitepaper_turnin/Off
enseVsDefense.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4HN-6WTS].
40
Flash
Mob
History,
ARTISTS
AGAINST
419,
http://wiki.aa419.org/index.php/Flash_Mob_History (last visited Sept. 17, 2014)
[https://perma.cc/XT6R-Q79J].
41
Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that the biggest
technical hurdle “is that it is difficult to pin-point the exact source of [an] attack
since source addresses can easily be spoofed.”).
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to a reactive status quo.42 But among the biggest barriers, in the
United States but also around the world as we will see in Part III, are
legal.
2.1. U.S. Regulatory Context for Active Defense Measures
Critics for some time have stated that the “biggest impediment
to the deployment” of proactive cybersecurity measures have been
legal.43 For years, a variety of stakeholders including scholars, IT
practitioners, and the media have analyzed whether “Internet hack
back” represents a form of pragmatic self-defense, or digital
vigilantism—a debate that continues to this day.44 Dig deeper and
questions proliferate, such as whether non-malicious third parties
should be held liable for related damages.45 Similarly, the regulation
of honeypots is also legally unclear. 46 But among the most
important laws regulating this space at the federal level in the U.S.

42
For more on this topic, see Scott Dynes, Information Security Investment Case
Study: The Manufacturing Sector, CENTER FOR DIGITAL STRATEGIES (2006),
http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cds-uploads/researchprojects/pdf/InfoSecManufacturing.pdf.
43
Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 5.
44 See, e.g., Vikas Jayawal, William Yurcik & David Doss, Internet Hack Back:
Counter-Attacks as Self-Defense or Vigilantism, IEEE 2002 INT’L SYMP. ON TECH. & SOC’Y
(2002), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1013841 [https://perma.cc/98XAC2AP] (discussing whether defensive counterattacks with offensive capabilities are
appropriate for the civilian/commercial Internet context beyond information
warfare); Phil Harris, Cyber Defense vs. Cyber Vigilante—Part 2—Hacking Back,
SYMANTEC (July 16, 2013), https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cyberdefense-vs-cyber-vigilante-part-2-hacking-back [https://perma.cc/N847-Q2ZN]
(addressing various considerations that may or may not justify hacking back). See
also Matt Reynolds, Self-defense in Cyberspace Would Put Businesses at Risk, Experts
Say, MARKET WATCH (July 25, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/selfdefense-in-cyberspace-would-put-businesses-at-risk-experts-say-2019-0725?mod=hp_econ (“A House bill giving businesses the power to counter
cyberattacks outside their own computer networks is fraught with risks to U.S.
companies and critical infrastructure, and won’t stop criminals and nations from
making attacks, experts warn.”).
45
See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Ethics of Tracing Hacker Attacks through the
Machines of Innocent Persons, 2 INT’L J. INFO. ETHICS 1, 1 (2004), http://fiz1.fhpotsdam.de/volltext/ijie/05256.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U3X-Z5D4].
46 See Jerome Radcliffe, CyberLaw101: A Primer on US Laws Related to Honeypot
INST.
19
(2007),
https://www.sans.org/readingDeployments,
SANS
room/whitepapers/legal/cyberlaw-101-primer-laws-related-honeypotdeployments-1746 [https://perma.cc/7WBR-3WF8].
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context is the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),
which we turn to next.
2.1.1.

CFAA

The story of the CFAA begins, strangely enough, with a
blockbuster movie. In 1983, the movie War Games illustrated the
potential of hackers to break into the nation’s nuclear arsenal.
Reagan Administration officials took the threat seriously enough
that they worked with Congress to pass the 1986 CFAA.47 Why is a
1980s era law still so relevant more than thirty years later? The
CFAA, as amended in 2008, criminalizes knowing “unauthorized
access” of a computer or “unauthorized transmission” of malware,
along with “obtaining and trafficking private information, and
affecting the use of a computer (such as by using a computer to form
a botnet).” 48 One interpretation of the CFAA is that it prohibits
companies from accessing networks—even foreign ones due to the
law’s extraterritorial reach. Under this viewpoint, more passive
measures involving the unauthorized access of networks likely do
not violate the CFAA.49 But the global context is also worth keeping
in mind as many nations now have similar laws to CFAA in force—
as we discuss in Part III below.50
Interpretation of the CFAA as applied to hack-back campaigns
is an area of active debate. Historically, U.S. law enforcement has
taken a dim view of such a “vigilante view,” there is an unofficial
understanding that “[law enforcement] can’t handle the problem.
It’s too big. If you take care of things yourself, we will look in the
See Schmidle, supra note 33.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008); see also Jennifer Granick, Amendments to Computer
Crime Law Are a Dark Cloud with a Ray of Light, EFF (June 15, 2009),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/amendments-computer
[https://perma.cc/YGR5-JZZQ] (defining a botnet as a network of computers
working together to perform some task, such as, in the best case, a citizen science
project).
49 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS, , 6–7 (2014); Ellen Messmer, Hitting Back at Cyberattackers: Experts discuss pros
and
cons,
NETWORKWORLD
(Nov.
1,
2012,
12:19
PM),
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2161144/hitting-back-atcyberattackers--experts-discuss-pros-and-cons.html
[https://perma.cc/K9GUQUL8].
50
Anderson, Lum & Walha, supra note 39, at 13–15.
47
48
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other direction. Just be careful”—because problems still arise when
companies “get caught or when innocent bystanders are harmed.”51
As an example of the confusion that has ensued, consider the case in
2000 of Ehippies, which was then a U.K.-based online activist group,
that struck at Conxion—a California-based hosting service—with a
DoS attack. Conxion could have stopped the incoming traffic in
myriad ways, but they decided ultimately to “volley[] them back” at
Ehippies’ server,52 actions that were later deemed legal.53
The debate continues. Baker has asserted that defenders, for
example, who are taking back stolen data may not, in fact, violate
the CFAA.54 Professor Orin Kerr disagrees, taking the view that the
CFAA protects computer owners, not data owners. 55 However,
although federal-level cybercrime laws with the CFAA being a case
in point get most of the attention, it is important not to ignore statelevel efforts aimed at improving cybersecurity and regulating
hacking back.
2.1.2.

State-Level Anti-Hacking Laws

Due to inaction in Congress, states have been experimenting
with a range of regulatory interventions designed to provide
covered firms with greater certainty about the types of cybersecurity
best practices, and active defense policies, permitted by law. These
include laws designed to prohibit unauthorized access, similar to the
CFAA, along with data breach notification and anti-phishing laws,
along with laws designed to decrease the incidents of phishing, DoS

Id. at 22.
Deborah Radcliff, Should You Strike Back?, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 13, 2000,
12:00
AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/53869/_Should_You_Strike_Back_?p
ageNumber=2 [https://perma.cc/R3LG-2WR7].
53 Id. (“Chris Malinowski, the recently retired lieutenant commander of the
New York Police Department’s Computer Crime Squad, says ‘returning mail to
sender’ doesn’t constitute a crime. But many information technology professionals
say they wouldn’t risk taking such an action, even if they had explicit proof of the
source of the attack. The chief concern is accidentally slamming innocent sites
through which hackers have routed their attacks to conceal their tracks.”).
54
Stewart Baker, Orin Kerr & Eugene Volokh, The Hackback Debate, STEPTOE
CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/thehackback-debate/ [https://perma.cc/R8JA-9YQ3].
55 See id.
51
52
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and DDoS attacks, and extortion. The current state of these laws as
of June 2018 is summarized in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.
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Table 1: Status of State-Level Cybercrime Laws Related to Active
Defense56
Type of State Law
Hacking,
Unauthorized
Access, Computer
Trespass, Viruses,
Malware

Coverage
All 50 States

Data Breach
Notification Laws
Anti-Phishing
Laws

All 50 States

Anti-Denial of
Service/DDoS
Laws

23 States: Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona,
California,
Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New
Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and
Guam
25 States: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas,
California,

Description
All fifty states have
enacted laws that
generally prohibit
actions that interfere
with computers,
systems, programs, or
networks.
A total of twenty-three
states and Guam have
enacted laws targeting
phishing schemes.
Many other states have
laws concerning
deceptive practices or
identity theft that may
also apply to phishing
crimes.

56
These data have been compiled from the National Conference of State
Legislature (NCSL) Report on Computer Crime Statutes (June 14, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx#Hacking
[https://perma.cc/B5EU-DUV5]. It should also be noted that, in addition to these
laws, twelve states maintain “data security laws,” eight of which include a
requirement for firms to implement “reasonable” cybersecurity practices. One
example is Indiana. IND. CODE 24–4.9–3–3.5 (“A data base owner shall implement
and maintain reasonable procedures, including taking any appropriate corrective
action, to protect and safeguard from unlawful use or disclosure any personal
information of Indiana residents collected or maintained by the data base owner.”).
For more on this topic, see JEFF KOSSEFF, CYBERSECURITY LAW 42–43 (2017). At least
thirty-one states also boast data disposal laws that regulate when and how data is
destroyed, including the use of “reasonable measures” to ensure that these data are
“unreadable or undecipherable[.]” Id. at 49.
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Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New
Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and
Wyoming
20 States: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Nevada,
New Hampshire,
New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington,
Wyoming, Guam,
and Puerto Rico
5 States: California,
Michigan,
Connecticut, Texas,
and Wyoming

393

There are twenty states
and two U.S. territories
have laws expressly
prohibiting use of
spyware. Other state
laws against deceptive
practices, identity theft,
or computer crimes in
general may be
applicable to crimes
involving spyware.
Currently four states
have statutes that
address ransomware, or
computer extortion;
however, other state
laws prohibiting
malware and computer
trespass may be used to
prosecute these crimes
as well.

As is evident from these data, states have been making progress
in regulating cybersecurity even as Congress has been more
hesitant. This may be seen by the spread of data breach notification
laws, which now cover all U.S. states, territories, and Washington,
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D.C., despite the existence of a single federal standard. 57 Antiphishing, anti-Do, and anti-spyware laws seem to similarly be
reaching a tipping point, with nearly half of U.S. states adopting
versions of these prohibitions. However, perhaps surprisingly, only
a handful of states have laws tackling the ransomware epidemic
sweeping the nation that has impacted everything from hospitals
and police departments to municipalities. 58 The balance of these
laws is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 2: Prevalence of Select State-Level Cybersecurity Laws
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As for the substance of these statutes, there are various types of
state anti-hacking laws, each of may target specific conduct and
computer crimes. However, these laws vary tremendously in form
57 See, e.g., Selena Larson, Senators Introduce Data Breach Disclosure Bill, CNN,
(Dec. 1, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/technology/bill-data-breachlaws/index.html [https://perma.cc/MZX8-WZG3]. However, with the enactment
of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), we may now be seeing a
default 72-hour window take effect. See Allison Davenport, CLTC Research:
American Companies Struggle to Meet GDPR’s Data Breach Notification Rules, CTR. FOR
LONG-TERM
CYBERSECURITY
(May
16,
2018),
https://cltc.berkeley.edu/2018/05/16/cltc-research-american-companiesstruggle-meet-gdprs-data-breach-notification-rules/
[https://perma.cc/FT3SFSUY].
58 See Alfred Ng, The Global Ransomware Epidemic is Just Getting Started, CNET
(June 28, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/petya-goldeneye-wannacryransomware-global-epidemic-just-started/[https://perma.cc/KZ3Z-DEU9].
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and substance. For example, the state of California has imposed
laws aimed at all the types of computer crimes listed above.
California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access & Fraud Act,
which protects individuals, business, and government agencies
from unauthorized access, interference, and damage to computer
data and systems, has influenced other states to implement similar
anti-hacking laws.59
Because California is such a significant norm entrepreneur on
state anti-hacking laws, 60 it follows that its jurisdiction is often
stricter in the application of its computer crime statutes compared to
a state with relatively few computer crime statutes, like Indiana.
Indiana Code 35–43–2–3 Computer Trespass makes it a Class A
misdemeanor for one to “knowingly” or “intentionally” access a
computer, computer system or network without the owner’s
consent.61 In Indiana a Class A misdemeanor is punishable up to
one year in jail or a fine of up to $5,000. 62 Indiana’s computer
trespass statute is simpler compared to California’s Penal Code
Section 502, which includes an extensive list of prohibited computerrelated conduct, several definitions of “knowingly,” and a variety of
punishments that may be imposed. While Indiana has only one
general statute prohibiting computer trespass, California is one of
the few states that has enacted different statutes specifically
targeting the various types of computer crimes. For instance,
California is one of just five states to enact anti-ransomware laws,
listed in Table 1.63
59
Johnathan Levine & Heather Haggarty, California Online Privacy Laws: The
Battle for Personal Data, 25 J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL. 69, 69 (2016);
CAL. PENAL CODE §502.
60 See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998) (discussing the potential for norm
entrepreneurs to lead to a “norm cascade.”).
61
IND. CODE ANN. § 35–43–2–3 (2009).
62
However, Indiana is one of only eight states with a reasonable cybersecurity
requirement to protect personally identifiable information (PII), as discussed in
note 56.
63
Anti-ransomware laws are still in the early stages of development. On
September 27, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1137, which provided
that the use of ransomware is now punishable as extortion. Press Release, Sen.
Robert Hertzberg, Gov. Brown Signs Legislation Punishing Ransomware, (Sept. 27,
2016),
http://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/9272016-gov-brown-signs-legislationpunishing-ransomware [https://perma.cc/4YB8-3ZAD]. California Penal Code
Section 523(b)(1) states that “[e]very person who, with intent to extort property or
other consideration from another, introduces ransomware into any computer,
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Although most states are not on California’s level regarding
cybersecurity regulation, the fact that all fifty states generally
prohibit unauthorized access or interference with computer
systems, programs, and networks represents a norm cascade of
cybersecurity law that is quickly spreading in both scope and scale.
Indeed, the EU’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation was
modeled, in part, on California’s efforts.64 With time, other states
will be able to see the impact of laws enacted by leading influencers
in computer crime statutes, like California, and be able to discern
how to refine active defense measures within their own respective
jurisdictions. Yet this activity has not forestalled federal efforts at
similar regulations, which could preempt the norm cascade
currently unfolding across the nation, and indeed to an extent, the
world. The next section analyzes one of these efforts, including
special coverage of how the effort is being viewed by core
stakeholders such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
2.2. Analysis of Pending Active Defense Legislation
As of June 2018, Congress was considering a range of
cybersecurity legislation, from a privacy bill of rights,65 to election
security, 66 but included in this list is the Active Cyber Defense
Certainty (ACDC) Act, also often known as the Graves bill after
computer system, or computer network is punishable pursuant to Section 520 in the
same manner as if such property or other consideration were actually obtained by
means of the ransomware.” CAL. PENAL CODE. § 523(b)(1).
64 See Laura Sydell, Do Not Sell My Personal Information: California Eyes Data
Privacy
Measure,
NPR
(May
28,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/28/614419275/donot-sell-my-personal-information-california-eyes-data-privacy-measure
[https://perma.cc/GT54-LWH7].
65 See Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, As Facebook CEO Zuckerberg Testifies
to Congress, Senators Markey and Blumenthal Introduce Privacy Bill of Rights
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/asfacebook-ceo-zuckerberg-testifies-to-congress-senators-markey-and-blumenthalintroduce-privacy-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/CU3B-JDT3] (“Specifically, the
CONSENT Act: Requires edge providers to obtain opt-in consent from users to use,
share, or sell users’ personal information; Requires edge providers to develop
reasonable data security practices; Requires edge providers to notify users about all
collection, use, and sharing of users’ personal information; Requires edge providers
to notify users in the event of a breach; Requirements are enforced by the FTC.”).
66 See Martin Matishak, Lawmakers gather behind election security bill—at last,
POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/22/electionsecurity-bill-congress-437472 [https://perma.cc/9ZCR-H9UT].
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Congressman Tom Graves, a Republican from Georgia, whom
introduced it. As of June 2018, the bill had nine co-sponsors from
both political parties, and even though its imminent passage is
unlikely at least in its current form, it received sufficient attention to
analyze in some detail.67 Specifically, the ACDC Act would allow
firms to conduct surveillance on entities “who are thought to have
done hacking in the past or who, according to a tip or some other
intelligence, are planning an attack.” 68 The bill also clarifies “the
type of tools and techniques that defenders can use that exceed the
boundaries of their own computer network.”69 The bill, for example,
would permit defendants the ability to claim “that their activities
were “active cyber defense measures”70 so long as they could prove
a “persistent unauthorized intrusion” directed at their computers.71
In summary, according to Congressman Graves, “This is an effort to
give the private sector the tools they need to defend themselves[.]”72
Part of the impetus for the ACDC Act came from Congressman
Graves position as chairman of the financial-services subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee, in which capacity he was
hearing complaints from bank executives who “bought the antivirus
software and got all the patches [but] wanted to do more, and had
the skills and the tools to do more, but didn’t know if they could.
And some were taking extra steps but didn’t know if they should.”73
One episode of note in particular involved Iranian attacks on the
U.S. banking system, which prompted one bank CEO reportedly to
declare at a White House meeting, “Ladies and gentlemen, we are at
war!”74 In this instance, U.S. intelligence had known of the attacks
in advance, and even know the NSA had warned the FBI in advance,
which in turned reached out to the targeted banks, they still were
not able to shield themselves completely from the onslaught, and
were in fact investigated themselves in the aftermath.75 Perceptions
regarding active defense have changed under the Trump
Administration, as seen by former Secretary of Homeland Security
Kirstjen Nielsen’s support for DHS “to work with the private sector
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, H.R.4036, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).
Schmidle, supra note 33.
Wolff, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Schmidle, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to deploy active-defense tools against cyberintruders.” 76 White
House support for active defense has only deepened since former
Secretary Nielsen’s testimony, especially with the departure of some
well-known skeptics, such as former cybersecurity advisor Rob
Joyce.77 The U.S. DoD 2018 Cyber Strategy, for example, calls for a
policy of “‘defending forward to intercept and halt cyber threats,’
including responding with (counter)offensive measures.”78 Indeed,
this may be at least partly behind the Trump Administration’s
decision to not sign up to the Paris Call for Trust and Security and
Cyberspace, which included language against hacking back, as is
discussed further below.79
Concerns regarding the ACDC Act fall across several
dimensions, summarized in Table 2. For instance, former NSA
Directors Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Keith Alexander, among
others, have raised concerns about further destabilization in
cyberspace. 80 Others, such as Joyce, were more concerned about
“unqualified actors bringing risk to themselves, their targets, and
their governments.”81 Representatives from the Justice Department
are similarly worried about private actors “[undermining] lawenforcement investigations.” 82 And then, of course, there is the
specter of attribution that has long loomed large in active defense
discussions in particular and cybersecurity generally. 83 A former
NSA Deputy Director named Richard Ledgett, for example, has
Id.
See Brian Barrett, The White House Loses its Cybersecurity Brain Trust, WIRED
(Apr. 16, 2018, 06:56 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/rob-joyce-tom-bossertwhite-house-cybersecurity-policy/ [https://perma.cc/4QYE-QL69] (arguing that
Rob Joyce’s, as well as Tom Bossert’s, departure leaves a critical vacancy in
American cybersecurity leadership).
78
Jason Healey, Getting the Drop in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/getting-drop-cyberspace
[https://perma.cc/3VEB-G7L8].
79 See Louise Matsakis, The US Sits Out an International Cybersecurity Agreement,
WIRED (Nov. 12, 2018, 07:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/paris-callcybersecurity-united-states-microsoft/[https://perma.cc/Y3Y4-WNXE] (noting
that a number of “major American technology corporations” have endorsed the
agreement, even though the US itself has not).
80
See Schmidle, supra note 33 (referencing both Rogers’ and Alexander’s calls
to act with caution to avoid escalation when combatting cybersecurity threats).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., SHACKELFORD, supra note 23, at ch. 6; Scott J. Shackelford, From
Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 192 (2009).
76
77
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said: “Attribution is really hard. Companies have come to me with
what they thought was solid attribution, and they were wrong.” 84
Ultimately, though, at least from a national security perspective, it
is unwarranted escalation that bothers many policymakers and
analysts the most since it is so difficult for a private firm to know if
they are up against a hacktivist group, criminal syndicate, foreign
intelligence service, or a foreign state-owned enterprise. Even
Carpenter, whom successfully uncovered the Chinese espionage
campaign discussed in Part I, has said: “There’s a lot of luck
involved . . . Because you don’t know what other [intelligence or law
enforcement] operations may be going on.”85
Table 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Active Defense86

Advantages

Disadvantages

More advanced knowledge of
potential threats and the
attacker’s capabilities and
intent, which helps to mitigate
surprise and protect assets

Backfiring due to human error
or manipulation by the attacker

Greater range of options to
engage the attacker, including
flexibility in where, when, and
how

Collateral damage as a result of
disrupting or damaging an
innocent third party computer
or network or wrongly
attributing the source of an
attack

Enhanced ability to disrupt or
shut down a planned or
ongoing operation even after
the initial penetration of the
defender’s network

Escalation in an exchange
between attacker and defender
as a result of the attacker’s
response to ACD measures

Increased likelihood of
deterring future attacks by
complicating the attack,
impeding the use of data, and

Uncertain strategic implications,
including the potential political
and legal consequences of

84
85
86

Schmidle, supra note 33.
Id.
HOFFMAN & LEVITE, supra note 32, at 10.
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measures affecting external
networks

Crafters of the ACDC Act are well-aware of these critiques
summarized in Table 2, and consequently, built in safeguards. For
example, the bill “requires reporting to the FBI-led National Cyber
Investigative Joint Task Force before taking active-defense
measures, which will help federal law enforcement ensure
defenders use these tools responsibly.” 87 This would defuse, its
proponents argue, any concerns with regards to escalation and
attribution.88 But opinion remains split. For instance, according to
Matt Eggers, vice president of cybersecurity policy in the Cyber,
Intelligence, and Security division at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, “the Chamber is continuing to think through its
approach to active cyber “D” legislation.”89 Eggers said later that:
““Private entities should not be doing that [engaging in active
defense].”90 Moreover, the bill would mark a substantial push back
from the state-level trend discussed above whereby all fifty states
have criminalized unauthorized access, and the latest attempt to
chip away at these regimes—seen in Georgia, and discussed in the
introduction—resulted in a veto. The reintroduction of this bill in
2019 has not altered the politics, despite the most recent version
having bipartisan co-sponsors.91 That does not mean, though, that
the debate has been put to rest, the least of which because other

87
Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, Congressman Tom Graves,
https://tomgraves.house.gov/uploadedfiles/acdc_expaliner.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3RRM-W74F] (last visited June 26, 2018).
88 Id. at 2 (“These safeguards help ensure that active defense is only targeted
at the source of the attack, while imposing a strict standard of care on the defender
to ensure that innocent bystanders aren’t impact.”)
89
Interview with Matthew J. Eggers, Vice President for Cybersecurity Policy
in the Cyber, Intelligence, and Security Division, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov.
19, 2018).
90
Reynolds, supra note 44.
91 Id. (noting that under the 2019 version “Companies could monitor attacks
using a ‘beacon,’ or software that a company could embed in its files so that when
its data is stolen, it can trace where the attack is coming from. Under the bill,
businesses would inform law enforcement when they take an offensive measure.
However, the law would bar the destruction of an attacker’s data, or remote access
of the attacker’s computers.”).
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jurisdictions are pushing the boundaries of active defense regardless
of the official position taken by the federal government.
3.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVE DEFENSE: CASE STUDIES ON
CHINA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE G7

This section globalizes the discussion of active defense with a
view toward analyzing how other cyber powers are approaching
this same policy debate. 92 The analysis is important for U.S.
organizations as well since any hack-back measures they take may
run afoul of foreign laws. As such, while this part cannot do justice
to the world of cybersecurity regulations pertaining to active
defense, it does focus on efforts China, Singapore, Thailand,
Australia, and the G7 in hopes of identifying areas of policy
convergence and divergence between advanced democracies and
fast emerging markets that may be informative to U.S. policymakers
and managers.
3.1. China
China has long been proactive in both Internet governance and
cybersecurity regulation guided as it is by the concept of
“cyberspace sovereignty,” which has long been advanced by the
Chinese government,93 and of which active defense strategy is an
essential component. This doctrine dates back to at least 2010 when
the State Council of China declared its doctrine on cyber sovereignty
92
Lists of cyber powers vary greatly in their composition and methodology.
See,
e.g.,
JOSEPH
S.
NYE,
JR.,
CYBER
POWER
5–10
(2010),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/cyberpower.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW9B-Y972]; Shannon Vavra, The World’s Top Cyber
Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-top-cyberpowers-1513304669-4fa53675-b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html
[https://perma.cc/Y564-FG39].
93
See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking
the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private
Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 30–34 (2016) (comparing different national approaches
to cybersecurity, including China’s particularly centralized strategy); Scott J.
Shackelford & Frank W. Alexander, China’s Cyber Sovereignty: Paper Tiger or Rising
Dragon?,
ASIA
&
THE
PAC.
POL’Y
SOC’Y
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.policyforum.net/chinas-cybersovereignty/[https://perma.cc/HJ2Y-SBQQ] (discussing China’s philosophy that
cybersecurity efforts belongs in the hands of the State).
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in its “White Paper on the Internet in China,” which stated: “The
Chinese government believes that the Internet is an important
infrastructure facility for the nation. Within Chinese territory, the
Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The
Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected.”94
This paper also set out plans for enhancing cybersecurity and
combating cybercrime.95 However, it was not until 2015 that cyber
sovereignty was codified in China under the National Security Law,
which evoked active defense “to strengthen network management,
prevent, stop and punish cyberattacks, network intrusion, network
theft, and dissemination of illegal and harmful information such as
cybercrime.”96
The reason for China’s promotion of active cyber defense
measures was driven at least in part by its 2015 military strategy,97
which aimed at winning “informationized local wars” and
interpreted “China’s commitment to building a cyber force with the
capability to engage in offensive asymmetric cyber operations . . . [it
described] ‘active defense’ as adherence to the unity of strategic
defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the
principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and
adherence to the stance that ‘We will not attack unless we are
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.’”98 As may be
seen by this definition, the Chinese use of the “active defense” term
falls more on the passive end of the proactive cybersecurity
spectrum illustrated in Figure 1. This lack of clarity, discussed
further below, complicates international efforts aimed at
establishing cybersecurity norms with regards to active defense,
similar to foundational differences of opinion over multilateral
94
( 国 务 院 新 闻 办 公 室 网 站 ) [The Internet in China] (promulgated by
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 8,
2010), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2010/Document/667385/667385_5.htm
[https://perma.cc/4W4A-YTTT].
95 Id.
96
( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 国 家 安 全 法 ) [National Security Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July
1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ (China).
97
(中国的军事战略) [China’s Military Strategy] (promulgated by Information
Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 26, 2015),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_2814751
15610833.htm [https://perma.cc/4W4A-YTTT] (“China will expedite the
development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation
awareness, cyber defense . . . ensure national network and information security,
and maintain national security and social stability.”).
98 Id.
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versus multi-stakeholder forms of Internet governance, 99 and the
differences between “information security” and “cybersecurity.”100
Chinese cyber sovereignty and active defense were further
reinforced by two national policies in 2016. The first was the
National Cyberspace Security Strategy (“Strategy”) released on
December 27, 2016, which set forth China’s positions and
propositions on the development and security of cyberspace. The
Strategy states nine tasks for the national cybersecurity work at
present and in the new future, including the need to safeguard cyber
sovereignty, and to crack down on cyber terrorism and crime.101 The
second was the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for the National
Information, published in December 2016 (“Plan”), which serves as
an action plan of the Strategy. The Plan states that “[c]yberspace is
a new area of national sovereignty. We should build cyberspace
protection forces that are commensurate with China’s international
status and compatible with our cyber power, vigorously develop
cybersecurity defenses, locate and defend against cyber intrusions
in time, and provide strong backing to safeguarding national
cybersecurity.”102 As part of the implementation of the Strategy and
Plan, China’s controversial Cyber Security Law, which came into
force in 2017, was designed to improve cyber sovereignty through
data localization and personal data protection. Among other
features, the law requires businesses operating critical information
infrastructure to store all personal data collected in China within the

99 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, 16
GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 83 (2015) (distinguishing national approaches to Internet
governance, particularly China’s commitment to national sovereignty and
“multilateral management” as opposed to the U.S.’s support for empowering “a
global multi-stakeholder community” to exercise oversight).
100 See Neal Ungerleider, The Chinese Way of Hacking, FAST COMPANY (July 13,
2011),
https://www.fastcompany.com/1766812/chinese-way-hacking
[https://perma.cc/62AM-XVS6] (transcribing an interview with Adam Segal, the
Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for counterterrorism and national security issues at the
Council on Foreign Relations, in which he discusses how the Chinese differentiate
between information security and cybersecurity).
101
(国家网络空间安全战略) [National Cybersecurity Strategy] (promulgated
by
the
Cyberspace
Administration
of
China,
Dec.
27,
2016),
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1227/c1001-28980829.html
[https://perma.cc/XKC4-44GJ].
102
(十三五”国家信息化规划) [Thirteenth Five-Year Plan], (promulgated by
the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Dec.
27,
2016),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201612/27/content_5153411.htm [https://perma.cc/DYD9-AM48].
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country.103 These strategies, plans, and laws provide the Chinese
government with “a much freer hand to compel a variety of local
and foreign firms to cooperate in law enforcement investigations
and protect ‘critical information infrastructure.’”104 Overall, these
policies solidify China’s march toward both cyber sovereignty—and
its efforts to spread this notion globally 105 —and active defense,
which will likely guide China’s activities in the cybersecurity to a
more “managed” Internet in the years to come.106
In summary, while the Chinese government has been interested
in active defense for more than a decade, there is a lack of clarity and
consensus on how the term is used and deployed as a matter of
governmental policy when compared to the United States. In fact,
China has long outsourced its cybersecurity capabilities employing
a diverse range of “patriotic hackers” targeting Western firms and
intelligence services.107 A case in point is the 2018 Marriott hack,
which resulted in the theft of over 500 million customer records at
around the same time as the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
breach, making 2014 a time of “historic [cyber] assault” on U.S.
organizations.108 In hindsight, such incidents help shine a light on
the importance that the Obama Administration placed on securing

103
(中华人民共和国网络安全法) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic
of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz., Nov. 7,
2016, effective June 1, 2016) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (China).
104
Shackelford & Alexander, supra note 93.
105 See Evan Osnos, Making China Great Again, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/08/making-china-great-again
[https://perma.cc/8356-FGAM] (highlighting cyberspace as an area in which
China’s global leadership is strengthening in the face of increasing American
isolationism).
106 See Scott J. Shackelford, Welcome to the ‘Managed’ Internet: Unpacking CyberSovereignty in China’s New Cybersecurity Law, ASIA & THE PAC. POL’Y SOC. (June 15,
2017),
https://www.policyforum.net/welcome-managedinternet/[https://perma.cc/Q9CT-X8MD] (explaining that China, along with a
number of other countries, are increasingly agreeing on creating an increasingly
State “managed” rather than global form of cybersecurity policy).
107
See Guest Blogger for Net Politics, When China’s White-Hat Hackers Go
Patriotic,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(Mar.
13,
2017),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/when-chinas-white-hat-hackers-go-patriotic
[https://perma.cc/7A3X-HZH5] (noting that China has demonstrated “implicit
support” for young hackers’ attacking foreign targets, but also seeks to “restrain
[the hackers] from undercutting Beijing’s overall cyber strategy”).
108
Lily Hay Newman, If China Hacked Marriott, 2014 Marked a Full-On Assault,
WIRED (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/marriott-hack-china-2014opm-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/R55P-XACF].
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the 2015 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Code of Conduct. 109 The
agreement may have helped mitigate the bilateral theft of
intellectual property in the short term. However, as these practices
show no signs of abating and may even be getting worse in the face
of ongoing trade tensions,110 other nations—including Singapore—
have begun to push the envelope on proactive cybersecurity.
3.2. Singapore
As with China, Singapore has been a leader in proactive
cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific for years in part due to its status as
an epicenter for advanced technologies and finance. 111 In 2014,
Singapore allowed private entities to take proactive cyber defense
measures by amending its Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act.
Specifically, it began permitting the government to issue certificates
directing “specified persons” to prevent, detect, or counter specific
threats to its critical infrastructure, including the financial
industry.112 As of this writing, there has not yet been a public vetting
of the performance of this initiative.
To further its active defense efforts, in July 2017, the Cyber
Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) released a draft cybersecurity
bill for consultation. 113 The Cybersecurity Act was enacted on
109 See Ellen Nakashima & Paul Sonne, China hacked a Navy contractor and
secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-anavy-contractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarinewarfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c86896becdcc
[https://perma.cc/52XM7W3R] (explaining that while China pledged in 2015 not to conduct commercial
cyberespionage against the U.S., China does continue engage in some hacking
activity against the U.S.).
110 Lily Hay Newman, China Escalates Hacks Against the US as Trade Tensions
Rise, WIRED (June 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/china-hacks-againstunited-states/[https://perma.cc/BS58-VPK4].
111
See, e.g., Cung Vu, Policy Report: Cyber Security in Singapore, S. RAJARATNAM
SCH.
INT’L
STUD.
(Dec.
2016),
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/PR170217_Cybersecurity-in-Singapore.pdf
[https://perma.cc/293U-VEQ7] (analyzing the role of technology in the Singapore
economy as a driver of the country’s investment in cyber security initiatives).
112
Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act, Ch. 50A, pt. 3, § 15(A)(1) (2014)
(Sing.).
113
Wai Ming Yap & Gina Ng, Singapore Parliament Introduces Cybersecurity Bill,
LEXOLOGY
(Feb.
14,
2018),
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March 2, 2018. It grants commissioners and investigating officers
more powers and tools to investigate and prevent cyber threats,
including potentially active defense measures.114 In the case of any
serious and imminent threat to an essential critical infrastructure
sector—namely finance, given its outsized role in Singapore’s
economy115—in an emergency the Minister may direct or authorize
individuals and organizations to take certain measures or to comply
with requirements “as may be necessary to prevent, detect or
counter any threat to a computer or computer system or any class of
computers or systems or services.” 116 Those measures and
requirements include, but are not limited to, “requiring or
authorising the specified person to direct another person to provide
any information that is necessary to identify, detect or counter any
such threat,” “providing to the Minister or the Commissioner any
information . . . obtained from any computer,” or specified person,
and “providing to the Minister or the Commissioner a report of a
breach or an attempted breach of cybersecurity.”117 The specified
person would then be immune to civil or criminal liabilities if the
actions were performed as required by the commissioners. But if
they do not comply, they will be subject to a fine or imprisonment
as specified by the Act.118
Singapore’s active defense initiatives highlight a development
mirrored across other nations discussed below. With regard to more
aggressive active defense activities such as hack back, the primary
concerns discussed above have centered on escalation and
attribution. 119 By requiring State authorization, Singapore has
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=64cb1ae1-1306-465a-bfb0be0679671565 [https://perma.cc/ACD8-LRM4].
114
Cybersecurity Act 2018, No. 9 of 2018 (2018) (Sing.).
115 See Gabriel Olano, Singapore’s insurance and finance sector growth to outpace
national
economy—MAS,
INSURANCE BUS. MAG.
(Dec.
14,
2017),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/asia/news/breakingnews/singapores-insurance-and-finance-sector-growth-to-outpace-nationaleconomy--mas-87663.aspx [https://perma.cc/PXT6-2XQX] (noting that in 2017,
the finance industry was “expected to post a 3.7% growth rate, exceeding the
national figure.”).
116
Cybersecurity Act 2018, No. 9 of 2018, pt. 4 § 23 (2018) (Sing.).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119
See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
UNITS
59
(2013),
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeyewww/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE8B-TGAN]
(noting that “in a State that rigorously monitors Internet use, it is highly unlikely”
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enjoyed some of the benefits of using private actors as primary
responders to “emergency” cyber threats while taking some
measures to maintain accountability. This is similar to how the
architects of the ACDC Act envision the role of the FBI in restraining
and shaping U.S. firms’ active defense efforts.
3.3. Thailand
As with Singapore, cybersecurity has continued to be a
preoccupation of the Thai government. In 2018, there were 2,520
incidents reported to Thailand’s Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT), including 1102 intrusion attempts and 335 successful
intrusions. 120 Firms have become more concerned about their
computer systems and data due to this onslaught. Defense-indepth, including encryption and intrusion detection systems, is
central to securing these companies and deterring cyber attacks.
And the Computer-Related Crime Act, similar to CFAA, prohibits
private firms from going after criminals themselves; active defense
in Thailand is generally considered illegal. Section 5 of the
Computer-Related Crime Act, for example, indicates that “any
person who illegally accesses a computer system for which a specific
access prevention measure is not intended for their own use shall be
liable to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not
exceeding ten thousand baht, or both.”121 Section 8 states:
Any person who illegitimately perpetrates any act by
electronic means to intercept computer data of other people
during its transmission in a computer system and that
computer data is not intended for the public interest or for
use of general people, shall be subject to imprisonment not

that the government is “unaware of an attack group” with significant operational
capacities).
120
Statistics 2018, THAI. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM,
https://www.thaicert.or.th/statistics/statistics-en.html [https://perma.cc/QB3KEPJP].
121
Computer-Related Crime Act, No. 2 B.E. 2560 § 5 (2017) (Thai.), translated
in Thailand’s Computer-related Crime Act 2017, THAI NETIZEN NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://thainetizen.org/docs/cybercrime-act-2017/
[https://perma.cc/5X3Z37E7].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

408

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

exceeding three years, or a fine not exceeding sixty thousand
baht, or both.122
Furthermore, Section 25 states that if evidence, including
computer data or computer traffic data, has been acquired by illegal
means, such evidence cannot be used in courts of law.123
Three government officials working in Thai cybersecurity units
who wish to remain anonymous were interviewed for this case
study. All of them confirmed that “hack back” activities are illegal
in Thailand, yet private firms can install defensive mechanisms such
as firewalls, IDS, and encryption. However, under a cyber attack,
“they are required by law to notify law enforcement agencies. In
order to collect evidence of an attack, firms can use honeypots only
to collect such evidence and a record of activities, and they need to
turn this evidence in to law enforcement in the case of any
incident.”124 One of the Thai cybersecurity officials mentioned that
in the event of an attack, “companies can protect themselves or stop
the attack, for example, by pulling the plug, but they are not allowed
to engage any activities that create damage to other networks or
computer systems. The defense must not damage any customer
data.”125 The Computer Crime Act does not allow a private Thaibased firm to proactively go after hackers. One police officer in the
Thai cybercrime unit mentioned that “active defense should be
discouraged because this action can create collateral damage to the
Id. at § 8.
Id. at § 25. Yet, the law in criminal procedure code section 226/1 allows the
police or law enforcement to obtain evidence through illegal means, and such
evidence can be used in a court of law. This section of the criminal procedure code
is normally applied to physical crime. In terms of cybercrime, it is unclear whether
this section can be applied. “Where it is appearing to in Court that any evidence
arised duly but derived wrongfully, such evidence shall not be admitted by the
Court, unless the admission of such evidence will have more useful effect on giving
justice than bad effect arisen from an impact on the standard of criminal justice
work system or basic right of liberty of people. In consideration of admitting an
evidence according to the first paragraph, the Court shall consider all circumstance
of case without thinking of the following factors: (1) Proval Value, importance and
convincing of evidence; (2) Circumstances and gravity of offence in case; (3) Nature
and injury being arisen from the acting in bad faith; (4) A person, doing wrongful
act being a cause of deriving the evidence, is punished or not and how it is.”
Criminal Procedure Code, B.E. 2477 § 226/1, translated in NATLEX: Database of
national labour, social security and related human rights legislation, INT’L LAB. ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/93536/109383/F2035808
79/THA93536%20EngTha.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HNP-GDYQ].
124
Telephone Interview with Senior Official, Thai Electronic Transactions
Development Agency, in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 9, 2018).
125 Id.
122
123
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network and other computer systems.”126 One of the senior police
officers interviewed who specializes in cybercrime investigations
mentioned that “computer networks involve many jurisdictions and
active defense can violate other nation’s laws,” a topic returned to
below. 127 When asked if there was any possibility of having
regulations for active defense, another Thai government official
mentioned that “the initiative must come from international
agreement or regulations from organizations such as the United
Nations or Interpol, and there is a need to have regulations that
cover the scope of active defense.”128 If anything, with the Paris Call
being a case in point, the international community seems to be
turning away from such a permissive regime save, perhaps, for
elements within the United States and Singapore as is discussed
further in Part IV.
In summary, Thai law allows companies to maintain passive
defensive mechanisms within their own systems. The law prohibits
hacking back or other aggressive active defense measures shown in
Figure 1 that damages third party computer systems, similar to the
CFAA approach. Even though Thai law might be amended if
international guidelines are introduced concerning active defense,
this seems unlikely, especially given the Australian and G7
approaches to proactive cybersecurity outlined below.
3.4. Australia
As stated in Australian Cyber Security Center’s 2015 Threat
Report, the cyber threat faced by Australia is “undeniable,
unrelenting, and continues to grow.” 129 But unlike China,
Singapore, or Thailand, Australia has long embraced a more bottomup approach to cybersecurity risk management emblematic in its
receptive stance to the National Institute for Standards and

126
Telephone Interview with Police Colonel, Royal Thai Police, Cybercrime
Unit, in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 9, 2018).
127 See infra Part III(E).
128
Telephone Interview, Police Inspector, Royal Thai Police, Cybercrime Unit,
in Bangkok, Thai. (Nov. 5, 2018).
129
AUSTRALIAN CYBER SEC. CTR., ACSC 2015 THREAT REPORT 2 (2015),
https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/201903/ACSC_Threat_Report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GQY-J6GQ].
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Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF). 130 To help
protect its public sector, Australia opened the Cyber Security Centre
in 2014 and established the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting
Network, allowing individuals to report cybercrimes that breach
Australian law.131
As for specific provisions of Australian law, the broad Privacy
Act impacts all companies with revenues of more than $3 million
annually. 132 The Act includes a “data security principle,” which
requires entities that hold personal information to take “such steps
as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information” and
to delete information that is no longer relevant for any purpose.133
Moreover, the Australian Criminal Code prohibits “any
unauthorized access to data held in a computer.” 134 As of this
writing, only the Australian military enjoys aggressive active
defense responsibilities but, like the U.S. case study, there have been
proposals to change the status quo and free up the private sector to
protect their own networks.135 It is worthwhile to couch these case
130
See Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A
Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 217, 252
(2016),
https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-16-no-2/bottoms-up.html
[https://perma.cc/D5AH-YC7F] (“This updated Australian cybersecurity strategy
is believed to be incorporating elements of the NIST framework . . . [t]his would
allow private companies to determine the appropriate level of cybersecurity for
their business needs and risk tolerance.”).
131
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., AUSTRALIA’S CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 29
(2016),
https://cybersecuritystrategy.pmc.gov.au/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NGV2-VQ3M] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
132
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Part II, div. 1, § 6D (Austl.).
133
Privacy Fact Sheet 17: Australian Privacy Principles, OFFICE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN
INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER
(Jan.
2014),
https://www.une.edu.au/about-une/leadership/governance/une-legal-andgovernance/privacy?a=63745
[https://perma.cc/Q6XR-RG8W]
(emphasis
added). However, Australia also imposes data retention requirements in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Josh Taylor, Mandatory Data Retention Passes Australian
Parliament, ZDNET (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/mandatorydata-retention-passes-australian-parliament/
[https://perma.cc/96L5-9J7W]
(listing cases in which Australia has imposed data retention requirements).
134
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 10.7 s 477.1 (Austl.).
135 See Marcus Thompson, The ADF and Cyber Warfare, 200 AUSTRALIAN DEF.
FORCE
J.
43,
43–44
(2016),
https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/ADFJ/Documents/issue_200/Thompson_N
ov_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U2N-3MD6] (describing a variety of perspectives
on the ways in which Australia needs to modernize and solidify its cybersecurity
strategy); Nawaf Bitar, Advanced Cyber Attackers Necessitate an Active Defense, ABC
TECHNOLOGY
&
GAMES
(Aug.
1,
2014),
http://www.abc.net.au/technology/articles/2014/08/01/4058780.htm
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studies in greater context, hence the following section that unpacks
the G7’s efforts to regulate active defense.
3.5. G7
Although a deep dive into each G7 nation is beyond the scope of
this inquiry and has already been accomplished elsewhere,136 Table
3 does provide a synopsis of each jurisdiction’s current regulation of
active defense.
Table 3: Sample of Regulations from G7 Nations Pertaining to Active
Defense137
[https://perma.cc/9UNC-JT4G] (arguing for Australia to adopt an approach of
“Active Defense, which looks to actively disrupt attackers when they are
attempting to attack an organization’s infrastructures, but without crossing the line
and risking retaliation.”).
136 See Craig, Shackelford & Hiller, supra note 11 at 740–743.
137
Id. (providing an earlier version of this table). These data were assembled
from the following sources: Donna Simmons, Laws of Canada as they Pertain to
Computer Crime, SANS INST. (2002), https://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/legal/laws-canada-pertain-computer-crime-673
[https://perma.cc/ZU64-YBXL]; Cybercrime and the Criminal Code, CAN. DEP’T
JUST. (2012), https://www.canada.ca/en/services/policing/police/crime-andLAW,
crime-prevention/cybercrime.html;
France,
CYBERCRIME
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/France.html
[https://perma.cc/88MP-ZJUA];
Valéry Marchive, Cyberdefence to Become Cyber-Attack as France Gets Ready to go on
the Offensive, ZDNET (May 3, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/cyberdefence-tobecome-cyber-attack-as-france-gets-ready-to-go-on-the-offensive-7000014878/
LAW,
[https://perma.cc/TH4C-3KL3];
Germany,
CYBERCRIME
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Germany.html [https://perma.cc/TRJ5-YEV2];
Bettina Weisser, Cyber Crime—The Information Society and Related Crimes (2013),
http://www.penal.org/spip/IMG/file/RM-8.pdf; Italy, CYBERCRIME LAW,
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Italy.html
[https://perma.cc/UP8X-R6Q6];
Japan,
CYBERCRIME
LAW,
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Japan.html
[https://perma.cc/7R8Q-F2C2]; Graeme McMillan, Japan Criminalizes Cybercrime:
Make a Virus, Get Three Years in Jail, TIME (June 17, 2011),
http://techland.time.com/2011/06/17/japan-criminalizes-cybercrime-make-avirus-get-three-years-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/TS6Y-39MP]; Japanese Cyber
Security Strategy and related Documents, http://www.space-cyber.jp/cyber/
[https://perma.cc/5S62-SHWW]; Ryusuke Masuoka & Tsutomu Ishino, Cyber
Security
in
Japan,
CIPPS
(2012),
http://www.cipps.org/group/cyber_memo/003_121204.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CPV-U6KZ]; Takato Natsui, Cybercrimes in Japan: Recent Cases,
Legislations,
Problems
and
Perspectives,
http://cyberlaw.la.coocan.jp/Documents/netsafepapers_takatonatsui_japan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5492-NWY9]; Robert Lipovsky, Aleksandr Matrosov, & Dmitry
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COUNTRY
Canada

TITLE OF LAW
•
•

Criminal Code
of Canada §
342.1
Criminal Code
of Canada §
430(1.1)

YEAR OF
LAW
• 1985
• 1985

[Vol. 41:2

RELEVANT LANGUAGE
•

“Every one who,
fraudulently and
without colour of
right, obtains,
directly or indirectly,
any computer
service … is guilty of
an indictable offense
…”
• “Every one commits
mischief who
willfully
a. Destroys or alters
data;
b. Renders data
meaningless,
useless or
ineffective;
c. Obstructs,
interrupts or
interferes with the
lawful use of data;
or
d. Obstructs,
interrupts or
interferes with any
person in the lawful
use of data or
denies access to
data to any person
who is entitled to
access thereto.

Volkov,
Cybercrime
in
Russia:
Trends
and
Issues,
ESET
(2011),
https://www.slideshare.net/matrosov/cybercrime-in-russia-trends-and-issues
[https://perma.cc/PNE4-JH6A]; David Emm, Cybercrime and the Law: A Review of
UK
Computer
Crime
Legislation,
SEC.
LIST
(May
29,
2009),
http://securelist.com/analysis/publications/36253/cybercrime-and-the-law-areview-of-uk-computer-crime-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/8GAZ-UNLT]; U.K.,
CYBERCRIME
LAW,
https://www.cybercrimelaw.net/UK.html
[https://perma.cc/4XXN-JSKJ]. For more information on the U.K.’s efforts with
regard to active defense, see Active Cyber Defense, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR.,
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/active-cyber-defence [https://perma.cc/YHJ9-KX58].
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France

Penal Code Article
323-1

2000 (not
in force
until
2002)

Germany

Penal Code Section
202(a): Data
Espionage

1998

Italy

Penal Code Article
615
ter: Unauthorized
access into a
computer or
telecommunication
systems

2008

Japan

Law No. 128,
Article 3:
Unauthorized
Computer Access
Law
Computer Misuse
Act

1999 (In
effect in
2000)

United
Kingdom
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1990
(amended
in 2006—
Police
and
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“Fraudulent accessing or
remaining within all or
part of an automated
data processing system
is punished by a
sentence not exceeding
two years’ imprisonment
and a fine of 30.000
euro.”
“Any person who
obtains without
authorization, for
himself or for another,
data which are not
meant for him and
which are specially
protected against
unauthorized access,
shall be liable to
imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three
years or to a fine.”
“Anyone who enters
unauthorized into a
computer or
telecommunication
system protected by
security measures, or
remains in it against the
expressed or implied
will of the one who has
the right to exclude him,
shall be sentenced to
imprisonment not
exceeding three years.”
“No person shall
conduct an act of
unauthorized computer
access.”
“(1)A person is guilty of
an offence if—
a.

he causes a
computer to perform
any function with
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Justice
Act,
Section
35)

United
States

•

USA Patriot
Act
• Computer
Fraud and
Abuse Act

18 U.S.C.
§ 1030
(2001)

intent to secure
access to any
program or data
held in any
computer [,or to
enable any such
access to be secured]
b.

the access he intends
to secure [,or to
enable to be
secured,] is
unauthorised; and

c.

he knows at the time
when he causes the
computer to perform
the function that that
is the case.”

•

This Amendment to
the Patriot Act
pertains to
“computers outside
of the United States
so long as they affect
‘interstate or foreign
commerce or
communication of
the United States.’138
The Computer
Fraud and Abuse
Act regulates those
who “knowingly” or
“intentionally”
access “a computer
without
authorization or
exceed[] authorized
access . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).

8 U.S.C. §
1030
(1984, last
updated
2008)
•

138
For a thorough review of U.S. cybercrime law as it pertains to active
defense and “hacking back,” see Prosecuting Computer Crimes, DEP’T JUST., OFF.
LEGAL
EDUC.,
3,
tbl.
1
(2010),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/474U-LQH7].
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The Department of
Justice has noted
that “[t]he term
‘without
authorization’ is not
defined by the
CFAA. The term
‘exceeds authorized
access’ means ‘to
access a computer
with authorization
and to use such
access to obtain or
alter information in
the computer that
the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain
or alter.’” 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(6).”139

At least three converging trends are apparent from Table 3,
among them: (1) the fact that every G7 nation, as well as all 50 U.S.
states along with Thailand, forbids unauthorized access,
demonstrating the uphill battle faced by new active defense
legislation; (2) that these laws are mostly dated at this point given
the fast pace at which cybersecurity is advancing, as well as being
rather broad, similar to China and Australia’s approaches (Canada’s
Criminal Code regulates unauthorized access broadly as
“[e]veryone [who] commits mischief”140); and (3) that the penalties
involved vary greatly. Fines can reach 30,000 euro in France.141 The
duration of jail time, though, does show more consistency, with the
exception of the United States, where sentences can exceed 20 years
Id. at 5.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 430(1.1) (Can.).
141
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 323–1 (Fr.); UGOLOVNIY KODEKS
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 272 (Illegal Accessing of
Computer Information) (Russ.). One area of divergence between these nations
involves the cybersecurity requirements on protected systems before the legal
regime is activated. In both Germany and Italy, for example, only networks
“specially protected against unauthorized access” are covered. STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 202(a) (Data Espionage), https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html
[https://perma.cc/T8YY-YT6D]
(Ger.); Penal Code art. 615-ter. (Unauthorized access into a computer or
telecommunication system) (It.).
139
140
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for CFAA violations. 142 Political convergence across the G7,
facilitated in no small part by the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), 143 has also helped propel
common cybersecurity norm building across this group. For
example, in 2017 the G7 reiterated a list of non-binding cybersecurity
norms, which were first identified in the 2015 United Nations Group
of Governmental Experts report and G20 Leaders’ Communiqué,144
a topic returned to in Part IV.
142 Prosecuting Computer Crimes, DEP’T JUST., OFF. LEGAL EDUC. 3, tbl. 1 (2010),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/474U-LQH7].
143
Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. 185 (Nov. 23, 2001),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/185.htm
[https://perma.cc/84EJ-FSBQ] [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention]. See also Stein
Schjolberg, The History of Global Harmonization on Cybercrime—The Road to Geneva,
LAW,
at
3,
(Dec.
2008),
CYBERCRIME
http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/cybercrime_history.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DKL2-5ZTE] (discussing the history of G8 efforts to mitigate
cybercrime).
144
Group of Seven, G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace,
at 3–5 (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RVU9-YA5V] (“1. Consistent with the purposes of the United
Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should
cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security
in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful
or that may pose threats to international peace and security; 2. In case of ICT
incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger
context of the event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment and the
nature and extent of the consequences; 3. States should not knowingly allow their
territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; 4. States should
consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other,
prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative
measures to address such threats. States may need to consider whether new
measures need to be developed in this respect; 5. States, in ensuring the secure use
of ICTs, should respect Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as
General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the
digital age, to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the right to
freedom of expression; 6. A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT
activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally
damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of
critical infrastructure to provide services to the public; 7. States should take
appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking
into account General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a global culture
of cybersecurity and the protection of critical information infrastructures, and other
relevant resolutions; 8. States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance
by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. States
should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity
aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory,

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/3

2019]

Rethinking Active Defense
4.

417

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND POLICYMAKERS

This final part explores some of the myriad implications of
permitting particularly more aggressive active defense measures as
a matter of policy, beginning with the underappreciated intersection
of proactive cybersecurity and cyber risk insurance. Next, we move
on to possible reform efforts, before concluding with a wider
discussion about the place of active defense as part of a push toward
cyber peace.
4.1. Cyber Risk Insurance
Insurance has long been recognized as being an important tool
in mitigating cyber risk, but is one that is relatively immature and
“not standardized, likely resulting in coverage gaps and a litigious
claims environment.”145 After all, insurance is a risk management
mechanism across sectors ranging from automobiles to floods.
Realizing the market opportunity, insurance firms have been
experimenting with cyber risk insurance policies since the early

taking into account due regard for sovereignty; 9. States should take reasonable
steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain so that end users can have
confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the
proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden
functions; 10. States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities
and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities to
limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent
infrastructure; 11. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm
the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes
known as computer emergency response teams or cybersecurity incident response
teams) of another State. A State should not use authorized emergency response
teams to engage in malicious international activity. 12. No country should conduct
or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or
other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”).
145
W. Jean Kwon, The Insurance Business in Transition to the Physical-Cyber
Market: Communication, Coordination and Harmonization of Cyber Risk
Coverages,
SSRN
WORKING
PAPER
(June
28,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201875.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

418

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

2000s.146 The market might exceed $7.5 billion by 2020,147 a trend
that is being fueled by new regulatory requirements such as
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).148
Yet, active defense is an arena that is only beginning to be
considered by insurance professionals. According to Stephen Vina,
a senior vice president at Marsh Insurance:
The cyber insurance market can adjust rather quickly to new
and evolving threats and cybersecurity techniques, but
active defense injects a level of legal uncertainty and risk that
carriers are unlikely to embrace at this time. However, there
is a wide range of active defense techniques and carriers will
undoubtedly work with their clients during the
underwriting process to ensure they fully understand the
practices involved, risks posed, and legality of the
activity. Should active defense gain firmer legal footing,
some in the cyber insurance industry may find it
advantageous to develop creative risk transfer solutions that
can help provide companies some financial protection as
they look to better secure their networks with more
advanced techniques. Moreover, cybersecurity companies
may look to the insurance industry to provide coverage for

146
Jon Swartz, Firms’ Hacking-Related Insurance Costs Soar, USA TODAY (Feb. 9,
2003), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2003-0209-hacker_x.htm [https://perma.cc/3P6E-38BF]; see also Safeonline Launches Internet
Security
Insurance,
HISCOX,
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/acmnews/msg00349.html.
147 See Jim Finkle, Cyber Insurance Premiums Rocket After High-Profile Attacks,
REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/12/uscybersecurity-insurance-insight-idUSKCN0S609M20151012
[https://perma.cc/HYM6-EXJY]; Nicole Perlroth, Insurance Against Cyber Attacks
Expected
to
Boom,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
29,
2011),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/insurance-against-cyber-attacksexpected-to-boom/ [https://perma.cc/5EBR-3LKE]; Robert Lemos, Should SMBs
Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, DARK READING (Sept. 9, 2010),
https://www.darkreading.com/should-smbs-invest-in-cyber-riskinsurance/d/did/1134322?piddl_msgorder=thrd [https://perma.cc/47SV-RSBL].
148 See Carolyn Cohn, Europe’s New Data Privacy Law Boosts Cyber Insurance
Sales,
INS.
J.
(May
22,
2018),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/05/22/489977.ht
m [https://perma.cc/XZ2V-E5WU] (“Insurers say the directive, together with
major cyber attacks like last year’s WannaCry and NotPetya viruses, is driving
demand in Europe for cyber insurance—a sector seen as relatively profitable.”).
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potential liability stemming from their active defense
services.149
It is likely that, regardless of new federal and state regulations,
the insurance industry will have an important role in shaping
corporate proactive cybersecurity policies, especially if a critical
mass of insurance providers elect not to insure companies that
engage in hacking back. That being said, activities that fall more on
the passive side of the active defense spectrum outlined in Figure 1
(e.g., intelligence gathering, intrusion reporting, honeypots, etc.) are
already becoming mainstays of effective cybersecurity risk
management,150 and as such may be encouraged by insurers.
4.2. Reform Efforts
Continuing confusion over the scope and meaning of the CFAA
specifically, and the permissible bounds of active defense in the
United States and abroad generally, has led to efforts aimed at
ensuring greater clarity. In the United States this stems from
potential policy reforms through both the executive and legislative
branches. For example, a 2016 George Washington University
report called on the Executive to:
1. [I]ssue public guidance to the private sector with respect
to active defense measures that it interprets to be allowable
under current law, indicating that DOJ would not pursue
criminal or civil action for such measures assuming that they
are related to the security of a company’s own information
and systems. Such guidance should be updated on a regular
basis consistent with ongoing developments in technology.
2. DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission should update
their “Antitrust Policy Statement on Cybersecurity
Information Sharing” (2014) to state clearly that antitrust

149
Interview with Stephen Vina, Senior Vice President, Marsh Insurance, in
New York, NY (July 10, 2018).
150 See, e.g., Mark Dargin, Increase Your Network Security: Deploy a Honeypot,
NETWORK
WORLD
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://www.networkworld.com/article/3234692/lan-wan/increase-yournetwork-security-deploy-a-honeypot.html
[https://perma.cc/6FV9-68R7]
(providing a useful description of the term “honeypot”).
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laws should not pose a barrier to intra-industry coordination
on active defense against cyber threats.
3. The Department of Homeland Security should
coordinate the development of operational procedures for
public-private sector coordination on active defense
measures, utilizing existing mechanisms for cooperation
such as the industry-led Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs) and Information Sharing and Analysis
Organizations (ISAOs), and the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) at DHS.151
The report, which included a number of notable co-chairs
including the former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
Chertoff, also suggested that NIST develop best practices with
regard to active defense (building from its work on the CSF), that
federal agencies fund new active defense research and development
initiatives, that the State Department work with international
partners on active defense norms development, and that the White
House work to define what steps federal agencies may take on
helping the private sector with active defense measures and with
coordinating this effort. 152 Many of these steps, though, will be
difficult to take under the Trump Administration’s current policies,
given U.S. disengagement from numerous multilateral fora
including in the Internet governance space.153
What can, or should, Congress do to help rethink active defense?
The George Washington Report suggests that Congress should pass
legislation to oversee the Executive Branch efforts outlined above,
but it also calls on Congress to amend the CFAA “to ensure that lowand medium-risk active defense measures are not directly
prohibited in statute.”154 However, what is meant exactly by “lowand medium-risk” measures is left undefined in the Report, a
somewhat curious omission given the well-known difficulties of
attribution and escalation in this space. This suggestion, though,
would seem to include a reformed Graves bill, so long as the
legislation incorporated appropriate (and mandatory) oversight,
151
INTO THE GRAY ZONE: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND ACTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST
CYBER THREATS, CTR. FOR CYBER & HOMELAND SEC., at xii–xiii (2016),
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/CCHSActiveDefenseReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P8K-QTBT].
152 Id. at xiv.
153 See Osnos, supra note 105 (suggesting the U.S.’s disengagement).
154
INTO THE GRAY ZONE, supra note 151, at xiii.
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clarified which types of primarily passive active defense such as
beaconing are permissible under other federal laws besides
CFAA, 155 clarified the scope and key terms used such as what is
meant by “persistent” breaches and “computer of the attacker,” 156
and was limited to only a narrow subset of the most damaging cyber
attacks, perhaps those targeting critical infrastructure sectors such
as the power grid, water, transportation, healthcare, and banking. A
pilot program, perhaps building from Singapore’s experience,
would help in this regard given ongoing concerns over attribution
and the numerous other objections to aggressive active defense
discussed above.
Finally, to establish industry active defense best practices, the
private sector can, and should, create new fora to coordinate
responses between stakeholders including Internet and Cloud
service providers, and leverage corporate governance to wargame
various scenarios and think through responses. 157 The insurance
industry can be a partner in this undertaking, as can other global
stakeholders. For example, Siemens unveiled its “Charter of Trust”
during the 2017 Munich Security Conference, which listed ten norms
“to enhance confidence in technology[,] including: “supply-chain
protection,” “security by default,” and “innovation,” which includes
deeper public-private partnerships that could include active
defense. 158 When combined with Microsoft’s push for a Digital
Geneva Convention, which would aim to, among other things,
protect critical infrastructure while limiting the development and
use of cyber weapons,159 there seems to be a growing appetite for
active private-sector engagement in cybersecurity norm building. In
155 See Chris Cook, Hacking Back in Black: Legal and Policy Concerns with the
Updated Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/47141/hacking-black-legal-policy-concernsupdated-active-cyber-defense-certainty-act/
[https://perma.cc/DJR5-WPUP]
(noting that the proposed ACDC Act “only amends the CFAA and says nothing
about the electronic surveillance statutes such as the Wiretap Act, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, and the Pen Register Trap and Trace statute.”).
Beaconing is the “the continuous transmission of small packets (beacons) that
advertise the presence of the base station.” Beaconing, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/38503/beaconing
[https://perma.cc/PZ44-G97J].
156 Id.
157 Id. at xiv.
158
Garrett Hinck, Private Sector Cyber-Norm Initiatives: A Summary, LAWFARE
(June 25, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/private-sector-cyber-norminitiatives-summary [https://perma.cc/54QZ-M8V9].
159 Id.
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fact, in April 2018, thirty-four leading tech firms—including
Microsoft and Facebook—signed the “Cybersecurity Tech Accord,”
which calls on signatories to help safeguard “users and customers”
from cyber attacks, and “oppose attacks on civilians and
businesses,” which, it seems, includes a prohibition on hacking
back.160 Such partnerships, including the Paris Call discussed next,
while not being embraced by all nations as of this writing, are also
indicative of a shift toward a more polycentric approach at
enhancing global cybersecurity in what could be considered a push
for cyber peace.
4.3. Prospects for a Proactive Cyber Peace
“Cyber peace” has been defined by the U.N. as “a universal
order of cyberspace” built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the
absence of disorder or disturbance and violence.” 161 However
desirable, such a cyber end-game is unlikely, at least in the near
term.162 Cyber peace is defined here, as it has been done in previous
works, not as the absence of conflict or what may be called negative
cyber peace.163 Rather, cyber peace is:
the construction of a network of multilevel regimes that
promote global, just, and sustainable cybersecurity by
clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries
alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and
espionage to levels comparable to other business and
national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach
to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from
the public and private sectors to build robust, secure
160
Id.; CYBERSECURITY TECH ACCORD, https://cybertechaccord.org/accord/
[https://perma.cc/ER8R-MUCS].
161
Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 82 (Int’l
Telecomm. Union & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec. eds., 2011),
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CLB-KY5R] (arguing that “unprovoked offensive cyber action,
indeed any cyber attack, is incompatible with the tenets of cyber peace”).
162
Cf. at 78 (“The definition [of cyber peace] cannot be watertight, but must
be rather intuitive, and incremental in its list of ingredients”).
163
The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts,
including civil rights. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Non-Violence and Racial Justice,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 118, 119 (1957) (arguing “[t]rue peace is not merely the absence
of some negative force—tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some
positive force—justice, good will and brotherhood”).
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systems, and couches cybersecurity within the larger debate
on Internet governance. 164
Working together through polycentric partnerships—such as
those Cybersecurity Tech Accord and Siemens’s Charter of Trust
discussed above—"we can mitigate the risk of cyber war by laying
the groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human
rights, spreads Internet access along with best practices, and
strengthens governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder
collaboration.”165 A key aspect of that effort is engaging in dialogue,
including about key policy differences surrounding cyber
sovereignty, 166 lest the worrying trend toward Internet
fragmentation continue unabated.167
What role can active defense play in such an undertaking?
Critics abound. Some commentators, for example, make the case
that deterrence-by-denial should be at the forefront of cybersecurity
policy given “[p]roblems of attribution, displays of power,
controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities.” 168
According to Professor Patrick Lin:
It is much too premature to allow for hacking back, even if
the practice isn’t immoral . . . At minimum, there needs to
be a clear process to authorize or post-hoc review cyber
counterattacks to ensure they’re justified, including penalties
SHACKELFORD, supra note 23, at xxv.
Id.
166 See Eric Rosenbach & Shu Min Chong, Governing Cyberspace: State Control
vs.
The
Multistakeholder
Model,
BELFER
CTR.
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/governing-cyberspace-state-controlvs-multistakeholdermodel?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Chi
na_Cyber_Sovereignty_paper%20(2)&utm_content=&spMailingID=21986839&sp
UserID=MjMwNjM5MzgzMTQ0S0&spJobID=1561316105&spReportId=MTU2MT
MxNjEwNQS2 (“The divide between nations that support governance models
based on cyber sovereignty, primarily China and Russia, and those that believe in
the multi-stakeholder model, including most liberal democracies, is one of the most
prominent ideological conflicts dividing cyberspace. Enhancing understanding on
both sides of these philosophies is an important step toward preventing further
fragmentation of cyberspace and necessary for avoiding conflict.”).
167
Daniel Voelsen, Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation: The Future of the Internet’s
Infrastructure and Global Internet Governance, SWP RESEARCH PAPER, at 1 (Nov. 2019),
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/cracks-in-the-internetsfoundation/.
168
Matthias Schulze, Cyber Deterrence is Overrated, SWP Comment No. 34,
at
1
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C34_she.pdf.
164
165
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for irresponsible attacks. That oversight infrastructure
hasn’t even been sketched out.169
The ACDC Act is an attempt at mitigating Professor Lin’s
concerns by tapping the FBI to play an oversight role. But this still
does not get to the bigger issue. As was argued in the New Yorker,
“[s]hould hacking back become legal, it may well help individual
victims of cybercrime, but it is unlikely to make the Internet a safer
place.”170 This view is shared by Chris Cook of the U.S. Department
of Justice, who said “the crucial question policymakers should be
asking is whether we are comfortable allowing foreign
actors/private entities to do on our own networks what we are
proposing to authorize on theirs.” 171 Such a destabilizing
development would curtail efforts aimed at establishing
international cybersecurity norms, as James Lewis, among others,
has argued, potentially leading to “an abandonment of U.S. efforts
to establish international norms against this type of activity.” 172
Concerns over friendly fire, and firms being caught in the middle of
protracted cyber conflicts involving myriad private- and publicsector stakeholders, did little to convince the Trump
Administration, for example, to embrace the Paris Call for Trust and
Stability in Cyberspace. This agreement is a multi-stakeholder
statement of principles designed to help guide the international
community toward greater cyber stability, and perhaps one day
cyber (also known as digital) peace. In particular, the agreement
calls for action to safeguard civilian infrastructure, Internet access,
and for the international community to “[t]ake steps to prevent nonState actors, including the private sector, from hacking-back, for
their own purposes or those of other non-State actors.”173 On the
day it was announced, more than 50 nations (with the notable
exception of the United States), “130 companies and 90 universities
and nongovernmental groups” signed the Paris Call,174 including its
pledge against allowing for aggressive active defense.
Wolff, supra note 2.
Schmidle, supra note 33.
171
Cook, supra note 155.
172 Id.
173
PARIS CALL FOR TRUST AND SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/paris_call_text_-_en_cle06f918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79JX-2LZE].
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David E. Sanger, U.S. Declines to Sign Declaration Discouraging Use of
Cyberattacks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2018),
169
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This emerging international norm against aggressive active
defense does not mean, though, that proactive cybersecurity—
especially on the passive side of the active defense spectrum—is not
essential to building resilience and due diligence across vulnerable
critical infrastructure sectors. In fact, such a “lean in” approach to
cybersecurity is essential to help guard against the more reactive
mindset that has long bedeviled the field of cybersecurity risk
management. 175 And more firms seem to be embracing this
viewpoint, even as there is continued strong resistance from the tech
community as seen in the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, across the G7,
and in all 50 U.S. states. According to Vina:
Legal uncertainties and potential unintended consequences
currently limit the practicality of active defense, leading to
more risk than reward at this point in time. When viewed
across a comprehensive cybersecurity risk management
strategy, firms are more inclined to select better established
cyber defenses with identifiable metrics that meet
business, contractual, or regulatory requirements. That said,
interest in active defense appears to be slowly growing as
policy makers consider cyber legislation to address more
sophisticated threats and cybersecurity within the business
community matures, leaving the door open for this tool to
grow in importance in the coming years.176
As the political winds shift, and more firms suffer from cyber
attacks that governments have so far failed to stop, passive active
defense may well become more mainstream in more nations. The
question is one of institutional clarify, harnessing the benefits while
minimizing the myriad risks in this practice.177 Already, in 2019 the
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/politics/us-cyberattacksdeclaration.html [https://perma.cc/UD5N-VCTN]; Indiana University Among First
to Endorse Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, IU NEWSROOM (Nov. 12,
2018), https://news.iu.edu/stories/2018/11/iu/releases/12-paris-call-for-trustand-security-in-cyberspace.html [https://perma.cc/X9KZ-UVFH].
175
MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 6 (2009),
https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_online
_012109.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6L4-KAML]
(comparing
cybersecurity
investment rates across countries and concluding that “it appears that decision
makers in many countries, particularly developed ones, are reactive rather than
proactive”).
176
Vina, supra note 149.
177 See Dalibor Rohac, Indiana’s Gift to the International Order, AM. INTEREST
(May 10, 2018), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/10/indianas-
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United States along with twenty-six other nations issued a “Joint
Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in
Cyberspace,” which underscored the point that “the international
rules-based order should guide state behavior in cyberspace.178 Yet
this Statement also maintained that these nations would “work
together on a voluntary basis to hold states accountable when they
act contrary” to the goal of ensuring “a free, open, and secure
cyberspace for future generations.”179 Clearly, then, “responsible”
State behavior remains in the eye of the beholder with accountability
mechanisms polycentric in nature, and still rather nascent. Such a
deficit in cybersecurity governance calls out for active engagement.
5.

CONCLUSION

This Article has tracked the debate surrounding active defense,
detailing how the policy has evolved at the state and federal level in
the United States, across the G7, and in other major economics,
including China, Australia, Thailand, and Singapore. Across these
jurisdictions, we see a historic reluctance to embrace the notion of
aggressive active defense (e.g., hacking back), and instead there has
been a marked trend toward criminalizing unauthorized access.
However, the Georgia hack-back bill, the ACDC Act, and
Singapore’s active defense policies portend policy shifts in the
making that could destabilize the status quo and impact on
cybersecurity norm developments. At a time when many forums
are being created and repurposed to promote stability, and even
some measure of cyber peace, if more nations permit active defense
then this progress, in the form of nascent norms as embodied in the
Paris Call, could be scuttled. To avoid this outcome, any policy of
permitting active defense should be narrowly tailored to only allow
passive active defense measures under strict government oversight,
and only then for the worst cyber attacks on civilian critical
infrastructure sectors. A better option might be to pursue an
attribution council that would allow for unbiased, third party
gift-to-the-international-order/ [https://perma.cc/3AJT-ZDAB] (suggesting the
need for balance between risks and benefits).
178
JOINT STATEMENT ON ADVANCING RESPONSIBLE STATE BEHAVIOR IN
CYBERSPACE, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.state.gov/jointstatement-on-advancing-responsible-state-behavior-in-cyberspace/.
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investigations of cyber attacks without assignment of liability. 180
Ultimately, we should embrace the best of proactive cybersecurity
while not letting the quest for cyber peace degenerate into a tit-fortat battle of digital vigilantes seeking to protect their networks but
ultimately exacerbating the very cyber insecurity they are fighting
to end.

180 See, e.g., Karl Grindal et al., Institutionalizing Transnational Cyber Attribution:
A Survey and Research Agenda (Ostrom Workshop Working Paper, 2018),
https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/pdf/seriespapers/2018fallcolloq/mueller-paper.pdf (providing a proposal of an attribution council).
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